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Abstract
Last spring there was growing concern in the wake of the Seventh Circuit’s deci-
sion in In re High Fruc-tose Corn Syrup1 that the courts might be adopting a more
receptive attitude toward antitrust claims based on allegations of consciously par-
allel pricing and other behavior in highly concentrated industries. Three decisions
in the last few months suggest that High Fructose Corn Syrup may remain an aber-
ration and that most courts remain deeply skeptical of claims that seek to infer
agreement from consciously parallel conduct without any hard evidence of con-
spiracy. Two of these three decisions, Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Phillip Morris2
and Hall v. United Air Lines, Inc.3 involved consciously parallel pricing behavior
and arose on mo-tions for summary judgment. Both decisions applied the well
established analytical framework under which a plaintiff, to survive a defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, must offer evidence of so-called plus factors, that
is, of facts, in addition to the consciously parallel behavior itself, that support an
inference of unlawful conspiracy. The third decision, Twombly v. Bell Atlantic
Corp.,4 applies this analytical framework to allegations of agreement arising from
consciously parallel conduct to dismiss the case on the pleadings. The case is of
additional interest because it is one of the few conscious parallelism cases involv-
ing an al-leged market allocation agreement, rather than alleged price fixing.
The Summary Judgment Standard and Pleading 
Requirements for Conspiracy Claims Relying on the 
Doctrine of Conscious Parallelism
WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING
Antitrust and 
Competition Law Update
WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING
WASHINGTON     s     NEW YORK   s    BALTIMORE     s     NORTHERN VIRGINIA     s     LONDON     s     BRUSSELS     s     BERLIN 
Last spring there was growing concern in the wake of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re High Fruc-
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a plaintiff, to survive a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, must offer evidence of so-called plus 
factors, that is, of facts, in addition to the consciously parallel behavior itself, that support an inference of 
unlawful conspiracy.  The third decision, Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,4 applies this analytical framework 
to allegations of agreement arising from consciously parallel conduct to dismiss the case on the pleadings. 
The case is of additional interest because it is one of the few conscious parallelism cases involving an al-
leged market allocation agreement, rather than alleged price fixing.
1  In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002).
2  Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Phillip Morris USA, 2003 WL 22171708 (11th Cir. Sept. 22, 2003)
3  Hall v. United Airlines, Inc. (E.D.N.C. Oct. 30, 2003).  Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering represented Lufthansa, one of the defendants 
in this proceeding.  Lufthansa settled with plaintiffs before the District Court issued its decision on defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment.
4  Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 2003 WL 22304824 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2003).  Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering represented Qwest, 
one of the defendants, in this matter.
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5  Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) (internal citations omitted).
Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Phillip Morris and Hall 
v. United Air Lines, Inc.: the Plus Factor Analysis 
in Summary Judgment Motions
In Williamson Oil, cigarette wholesalers claimed 
that the defendant cigarette manufacturers had en-
tered into a price-fixing agreement.  The plaintiffs 
relied on evidence of a series of parallel price in-
creases over seven years from 1993 to 2000.  In Hall, 
travel agents alleged that the defendant airlines had 
conspired to cut, cap, or eliminate base commissions 
they paid to travel agents for sales of domestic and 
international airline tickets.  The plaintiffs relied 
primarily on evidence of parallel reductions in com-
missions by the defendants.  
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits concerted 
action that unreasonably restrains trade.  It does not 
reach independent action by individual firms.  Ac-
cordingly, when plaintiffs base their Section 1 claims 
on circumstantial evidence, that evidence must be 
sufficient to support an inference that the defendants 
have acted in concert rather than independently. 
Thus, in Matsushita the Supreme Court laid down 
the principle that “to survive a motion for summary 
judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking 
damages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence 
‘that tends to exclude the possibility’ that the alleged 
conspirators acted independently.”5  Williamson Oil 
and Hall make clear that evidence offered to meet the 
plus factor requirement must also satisfy the Matsu-
shita standard.  In other words, the plus factor offered 
by the plaintiffs must tend to exclude the possibility 
that the defendants’ parallel conduct was the result 
of their independent business decisions.  Only when 
a plus factor serves to exclude that possibility does it 
support an inference of unlawful conspiracy.
In both cases the court found that none of the 
evidence plaintiffs presented as plus factors excluded 
the possibility of independent action and, therefore, 
dismissed the conspiracy claims.  Some general 
principles about which types of conduct may in 
fact constitute “plus factors” emerge from the two 
opinions:
• Mere participation in an oligopolistic 
market is not sufficient to infer an agree-
ment.
• Mere opportunity to conspire -- for ex-
ample, through active participation in 
trade associations or similar organizations 
-- does not, without more, support an infer-
ence of conspiracy.
• Public announcements through interviews 
or trade press articles regarding pricing or 
other business plans do not, without more, 
support an inference of conspiracy.
To sum up, Williamson Oil and Hall make 
explicit the connection between the general sum-
mary judgment standard for Section 1 claims, as 
laid down in Matsushita, and standards for judg-
ing evidence offered as plus factor in conspiracy 
claims relying on evidence of conscious parallel-
ism.  In drawing this connection the two decisions 
have made an important move toward a more uni-
fied, rigorous approach to the plus factor analysis 
for conscious parallelism claims at the summary 
judgment stage.
Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp.: The Plus 
Factor Analysis in Motions to Dismiss
In Twombly, the plaintiffs, purchasers of local 
telephone or high speed Internet services in the 
United States, alleged that the four remaining for-
mer regional Bell operating companies (BellSouth, 
Qwest, SBC, and Verizon) had entered into a na-
tional conspiracy to prevent potential competitors 
from entering into their respective markets and to 
allocate geographical markets for local telephone 
and high speed Internet services.  Before 1996, 
local phone companies had exclusive control over 
their respective territories.  This resulted partly 
from the industry structure that the 1982 consent 
decree between the United States and AT&T es-
tablished and partly from state regulations that 
restricted competition in local telephone markets. 
However, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art33
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opened markets to competition, by preempting 
state-imposed barriers to entry and by requiring 
incumbent local exchange carriers (“ILECs”) 
to facilitate competitors’ entry into their local 
telephone markets in return for the opportunity 
to compete in long-distance markets.  Because 
Congress feared that for most competing local 
exchange carriers (“CLECs”) building their own 
telecommunications infrastructure would be 
prohibitively expensive, the Act obligates ILECs 
to provide access to elements of their networks 
at low, regulated rates.  The plaintiffs made two 
principal conspiracy allegations.  First, they 
claimed that the defendants had agreed to vio-
late the obligation, imposed by the 1996 Act, to 
provide new entrants nondiscriminatory access to 
their networks.  Second, the plaintiffs alleged that 
the defendants had agreed not to compete in each 
other’s territories.  For both claims, they relied on 
a theory of conscious parallelism.  
The district court, in an opinion by Judge 
Gerard Lynch, concluded that permitting a Section 
1 complaint to rest on a conclusory allegation of 
parallel conduct would undermine two fundamen-
tal purposes of notice pleading: (1) that pleadings 
state a claim on which relief may be granted, and 
(2) that they give defendants adequate notice of the 
plaintiffs’ theory of the case.  According to the court, 
conscious parallelism raises a distinctive problem 
because the plaintiffs are necessarily seeking to state 
a cause of action by alleging that defendants have 
engaged in conduct that is, in itself, legal.  After all, 
parallel behavior often results from individual firms’ 
independent business decisions and their conduct 
converges merely because they have, for instance, 
similar cost structures, similar economic interests, 
and similar information about the market.  This fact 
has two implications for complaints relying on a 
theory of conscious parallelism.  First, to allow 
plaintiffs to proceed to the discovery stage by simply 
alleging that defendants have engaged in conduct 
that is in itself legal would circumvent Section 1’s 
conspiracy requirement and, thus, come into conflict 
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8’s require-
ment that complaints state a claim on which relief can 
be granted.  Second, because parallel behavior may 
well constitute legal, legitimate business conduct, a 
conclusory allegation of conscious parallelism does 
not give defendants notice of plaintiffs’ theory of 
what makes the conduct in question illegal.  In the 
case of conscious parallelism, the factual and eco-
nomic theory of conspiracy is simply not evident from 
a conclusory allegation of conspiracy and, therefore, 
there is no way to defend against it.
In evaluating whether the complaint satisfied 
the plus factor requirement, the judge applied the 
basic principle, also employed by Williamson and 
Hall, that the facts alleged must tend to exclude 
the possibility that the defendants have acted in-
dependently.  Under this standard, the court found 
unpersuasive the plaintiffs’ theory that defendant 
incumbent local exchange carriers had conspired 
to prevent CLECs from entering their respective 
territories.  Since independent economic interest 
fully explained the ILEC’s behavior, their parallel 
conduct did not justify an inference of conspiracy.
Similarly, the court rejected the theory that the 
defendants had agreed not to compete in each other’s 
territories because it relied on unfounded assump-
tions about the economics of the ILEC and CLEC 
businesses.  The ILECs’ decision not to enter each 
other’s territories was fully explainable as being 
in the individual economic interest of each ILEC. 
Therefore, no agreement could be inferred.
Twombly applied the same basic analytical 
framework as the courts did in Williamson and Hall 
and demonstrates the pleading requirements for 
conspiracy claims relying on a theory of conscious 
parallelism, just as Williamson and Hall demonstrate 
the evidentiary standard for summary judgment mo-
tions of such claims.  An allegation that defendants 
have engaged in parallel conduct is not sufficient 
to survive a motion to dismiss.  Rather, plaintiffs 
have either to allege facts showing a traditional, ex-
press agreement among the defendants or to plead 
“plus factors.”  Furthermore, a mere statement that 
defendants’ actions are against their own economic 
self-interest does not suffice.  Rather, such statements 
must actually be consistent with basic facts about 
the market and the economic interests of its play-
ers and must tend to exclude the possibility that the 
defendant acted independently.
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Conclusion
In the wake of the large number of high-vis-
ibility government cartel cases and FTC decisions 
such as Three Tenors,6 we can expect a continued 
increase in private litigation alleging concerted an-
ticompetitive conduct.  The three recent decisions 
discussed in this bulletin concerning the pleading 
requirements and summary judgment standards 
for conspiracy claims demonstrate that defendants 
will be able to defend against groundless Section 1 
claims based on theories of conscious parallelism 
and other circumstantial evidence.
Please contact us if you would like further 
information on these developments or would like 
information about any other issue of U.S. or foreign 
antitrust or competition law.
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6  In the Matter of Polygram Holding, Inc., et al., 2003 WL 21770765 (F.T.C. July 24, 2003).
http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art33
